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MERCHANT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO THE
REGULATION OF DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES
Richard F. Dole, Jr.t
In 1959 a Special Committee of the Antitrust Section of the New
York State Bar Association issued a report on the New York law of
unfair trade practices.' After an exhaustive analysis of the New York
statutes and decisions, the Special Committee recommended enactment
of a statute empowering the Attorney General or any district attorney
to enjoin the commission of "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service." 2
The Committee expressly refused to endorse a coordinate private
remedy,3 and the proposed statute declared that it neither enlarged
t Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. 1958, Bates College;
LL.B. 1961, LL.M. 1963, Cornell Law School; S.J.D. 1966, University of Michigan. Consultant, 1962-65, Special Committee on Unfair Competition, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This article does not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
I SPECIAL Comm. OF THE ANTTRUsT SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N,
SECOND REPORT (1959) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL Comm. REPORT]. The initial report
of the Committee dealt with the New York antitrust laws. SPECIAL Commu. OF THE ANTITRusT SECTION OF THE NEw YoR STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT (1957).
In its second report the Committee used the term "unfair competition" to refer to
the injurious commercial conduct it analyzed. SPECIAL Comm. REPORT 1. However, "unfair competition" has become outmoded as a designation for an area of law that regulates commercial conduct that is engaged in by both competitors and noncompetitors.
The term "trade practices" is preferred. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, ch. 35, Introductory
Note, at 536-37 (1938).
2 SPECIAL CoMm. REPORT 94a-95a.
S Id. at 11.
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nor diminished the rights of parties to private litigation. 4 Professor
Milton Handler, the Chairman of the Special Committee, stated that
the Committee had found the New York common law of deceptive trade
practices in ferment and had opted to let that ferment take its course
rather than run the risk of engaging in unwarranted legislative intervention. Nevertheless, he recommended that the Bar Association reexamine the common law remedies for deceptive trade practices in
about a decade to see if the time was then ripe for statutory codification
or change.5
The decade to which Professor Handler referred is almost over.
This article examines the developments in New York law during that
period in order to ascertain whether there is now an observable need
for legislation providing private remedies for deceptive trade practices.
This inquiry is of more than parochial interest. In the years since
Professor Handler's committee concluded its deliberations, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association House of Delegates have recommended that all
states enact the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 6 The new
Uniform Act provides a private injunctive remedy for deceptive trade
practices which complements the public injunctive remedy proposed
by the Special Committee in 1959. 7 Although the Uniform Act has
already been enacted in seven states,8 its adoption in New York would
4 Id. at 95a.
5 Handler, Proposals for Changing the Law of New York on Unfair Competition and
False Advertising, 1959 CCH ANTITRUST SYMPosIum 173, 176. The Special Committee also
noted that the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 40-58 (1964), from which its
proposed statute was derived, contained no private remedy so that it would be difficult
to predict the consequences of appending a private remedy to the proposed statute.
SPECIAL Comm. REPORT 11.
6 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws,

1964

HANDBOOK

131-32 [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]; 89 A.B.A. REP. 405 (1964). The Commissioners
have revised § 3(b) of the act, which deals with allowance of costs and attorneys' fees, inresponse to a resolution by the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law.
ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1965 PROCEEDINGS 54-56, 64-66,;
1966 HANDBOOK 90; 91 A.B.A. REP. 357 (1966). The current version of the act, which is
officially known as the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, appears in 1966
HANDBOOK 298-315 [hereinafter the current version of the act will be cited as UNIFORM
ACT]. The original form of the act can be found in 9A UNiroRM LAws ANN. (Supp. 1967).
and S. OPPENHEIk, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, app. E (2d ed. 1965).
7 UNIFORM ACT § 3(a).
8 CONN. GEN STAT. ANN.

§§ 42-115(c)-(f) (Supp. 1966); DEL. CODEt ANN. tit: 6, §§
2531-37 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 817.69-.75 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. §
(Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 to 48-606 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 2, §§ 311-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51-55 (Supp. 1967).
The Oklahoma enactment contains several deviations fr6nh the Tecommended version of the
act. Merrill, Oklahoma and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
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undoubtedly increase the- tempo of state enactments. Following adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in New York, the President of
the Uniform Commissioners observed:
[T]o those who are familiar with the difficulties and intricacies
involved in adapting the provisions of the Code to the multitudinous commercial transactions of that great state, the magnitude
of the achievement which this represents is apparent. It will no
doubt supply the necessary incentive to many of the smaller states
which heretofore have been hesitant, for, once the Code takes effect
in New York, no state which has any pretentions at all in the world
of commerce can be without it except at the risk of being completely out of step with the times.9
/
Thus far, the New York position on the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act has not crystallized. The 1967 Report of the Committee on New
York State Antitrust Law of the New York State Bar Association renewed the call/of the 1959 Special Committee for a statute enabling the
New York Attorney General to obtain injunctions against deceptive acts
and practices, but declined to take a position on the Uniform Act. The
Committee stated that "the question of whether New York should
adopt all, or part, of the Uniform Act requires another study and
report." 10 The following analysis may render further study unnecessary.
I
Tm NATURE OF THE UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRAD

PRACTICES

Aar

Section 2(a) of the Uniform Act contains both a general condemnation of deceptive commercial conduct and a series of specific subsections characterizing deceptive advertising, false disparagement, and
trade symbol infringement as deceptive trade practices." Deceptive
Laws, 1965, 36 J. OKLA. B. ASS'N 2205-08 (1965). Commentary on the Uniform Act includes
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967); Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step
Toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MNN. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
9 1962 HaDBOOK 52 (remarks of Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.).
10 1967 REPORT OF THE Commr.ON NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAW, NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASs'N 4-6, 11.
11 UNIoFm AcT § 2(a):
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation, or occupation, he:
(I) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(3)causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association With, or certification by, another;
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advertising consists of the dissemination of misleading factual state12
ments concerning the product, service, or business of the disseminator.
3
In Lower Main Street Merchants Association v. Paul Geller & Co.,'
for instance, competitors were declared to be entitled to an injunction
against a continuous "going out of business" sale by a retail men's
clothing store. False disparagement involves the unprivileged publication of false, injurious statements about the product, service, or business
of another.' 4 Thus, in Allen ManufacturingCo. v. Smith,' 5 the appellate
division approved an injunction against the distribution of spurious
United States Department of Agriculture documents that falsely indicated that the plaintiff's fly spray had been condemned by the government. Trade symbol infringement is the use of a commercial identification by one businessman that purchasers are likely to confuse with the
commercial identification previously used by another. 6 For example, in
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Standard Oil Co. of Maine,"7 the
long-established Standard Oil Company of New York was held entitled
to enjoin the use of the name "Standard Oil Company" by a newly(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services;
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person
has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not
have;
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered,

reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading
representation of fact;
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable
public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity;
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for,
existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.
Compare § 2(a)(12) with §§ 2(a)(l)-(l1).
12 See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 U.S. 182 (1927); Dole, The Emergence of Deceptive Advertising as a
Group Tort: A Possible Consequence of the 1966 Federal Rule Amendment with Respect
to Class Actions, 62 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 661, 671-72 (1967).
13 67 N.J. Super. 514, 171 A.2d 21 (Ch. 1961).
14 Prosser, Injurious Falsehood:The Basis of Liability, 59 CoLuM. L. REv. 425 (1959).
False disparagement is also known as injurious falsehood, slander of goods, and trade
libel. Id. False statements that impugn the integrity or credit of a business also constitute
actionable defamation. See Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 390, 64 N.E.

163, 164 (1902).
15 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (4th Dep't 1928).
16 R. DoLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND ThE ANTTnRusr LAws 4-11 (1965).
17 38 F.2d 677 (D. Me.), modified on other grounds, 45 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1930).

1968]

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

organized corporation that was engaged in the distribution of petroleum
products in northern New England.
Sections 2(b)' 8 and 3(a) 19 of the Uniform Act amplify section 2(a)
with declarations that evidence of competition between the parties,
actual confusion or misunderstanding, intent to deceive, and provable
monetary damage are not inflexible prerequisites to relief. These
sections do not preclude reference to such factors as evidence of probable damage, but make clear that other evidence of probable damage
will suffice. A wholesaler with an exclusive sales agency for a trademarked beverage may, for example, be damaged by repeated, false
assertions that the beverage is mislabeled, even though the retailer
20
who makes the claims is honestly mistaken about their truth.
The Uniform Act authorizes injunctive relief against deceptive
trade practices21 and preserves other state remedies not repealed in
conjunction with the enactment of the Uniform Act. 22 A court is also
given discretion to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if a
complainant has brought an action known to be groundless, or if a de23
fendant has deliberately engaged in a deceptive trade practice.
18 UNrFORm Aer § 2(b) provides: "In order to prevail in an action under this Act, a
complainant need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or
misunderstanding."
19 UN'oxur ACr § 3(a) provides:
A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may
be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on terms
that the court considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits,
or intent to deceive is not required....
20 Cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Restaurant Cherry Lane, Inc., 118 U.S.P.Q. 41
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
21 UniroRmf Acr § 3(a). For discussion of the reasons for omitting a damage remedy
from the Uniform Act, see Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another
Step Toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L. Rxv. 1005, 1017-18
(1967).
22 UNiFoRm Acr § 3(c). Section 2(c) coordinately provides: "This section does not affect
unfair trade practices otherwise actionable at common law or under other statutes of this

state."
23 Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs. The court [in its discretion] may award attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party if (1) the party complaining of a deceptive trade practice has brought an
action which he knew to be groundless or (2) the party charged with a deceptive
trade practice has willfully engaged in the trade practice knowing it to be
deceptive.
Id. § 3(b) (brackets in original). (The use of brackets in a Uniform Act indicates that the
Uniform Commissioners do not believe that uniformity requires enactment of the bracketed
language. 1966 HANDBOOK 399).
With a caveat that attorneys' fees could be assessed against a defendant only if the
court found that he had willfully engaged in a deceptive trade practice, the original
version of the Uniform Act authorized a court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party "in exceptional cases." E.g., 9A UNDFORMi LAws ANN. (Supp. 1961, at 17). In states
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II
REGULATION OF DECPIvE TRADE PRACTICES IN NEW YORK

The New York approach to the regulation of deceptive trade practices can be best evaluated by tracing the relationship between the
public and private sanctions for deceptive commercial conduct. The
major New York statutes affording public and private remedies for
deceptive advertising, false disparagement, and trade symbol infringement will be surveyed, 24 and an assessment will be made of the current
state of New York common law. This analysis will emphasize those
public and private remedies that are comparable to the injunctive
remedy of the Uniform Act. Thus, the consumer damage and rescission
remedies supplied by actions for breach of warranty25 and deceit 26 will
not be discussed. Finally, a judgment will be made concerning the significance of enactment of the Uniform Act in New York.
A. Statutes with Public Remedies
1. Deceptive Advertising
Most of the New York statutes that provide public remedies for
deceptive trade practices proscribe deceptive advertising, i.e., deceptive
representations made in connection with the marketing of goods or
services. Although thcse statutes are numerous, the statute authorizing
the Attorney General to seek injunctions against deceptive practices,
proposed by the Special Committee in 1959, is not among them. This
bill has failed of legislative enactment despite its repeated introduction
at the instance of the Attorney General.2 7 Nevertheless, the New York
where the original Uniform Act has been enacted, the "uniform interpret.ation" clause in
§ 5 should lead judges to interpret original § 3(b) in light of the 1966 amendment until
conforming amendments are made. For example, a strike suit under the Uniform Act
would constitute an "exceptional circumstance" justifying the award of attomeys' fees to
the defendant under the original wording of § 3(b). The 1966 amendment expressly singles
out this situation as an inst nte in which attorneys' fees can be awarded.
24 New York has many specific statutes relevant to deceptive trade practices. For
example, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 206(c) (McKinney 1968). makes it a misdemeanor for
a person to divert or to attempt to divert a person from a hotel, boarding house, roominghouse, or lodging house to another lodging by means of a false statement or representation
made for purposes of gain. However, as Jack Greenberg, Executive Director of the Special
Committee, observed, these laws have seldom been judicially construed and "cast little
light on our problem, except to underscore the episodic manner in which the legislature
has treated the problem." SPEC,4L Comss. Rr'oRr 14a.
25 E.g.. N.Y. U.C.C. 3§ 2.312 to 2-318. § 2-711 (McKinncy 1964).
26 See, e.g., Bioomquist v. Farson, 2202 N.Y. 375, 118 N.E. 855 (1918).
27 LeEkowitz, Consumer Protection by State Legislation, 1967 N.Y.S.B.A. ANTrrusT
SYMPosium 81, 84-93.
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Attorney General has obtained several other legislative grants of authority with respect to deceptive trade practice"s, and he maintains one
of the most active state consumer protection prcgrams in the country.28
a. Civil Remedies. The most useful weapons in the Attorney
General's statutory arsenal are sections 63(12) and (15) of the Executive Law.29 Section 63(12) permits the Attorney General to seek, on
five days' notice, an order enjoining "persistent fraud or illegality in
tl-.e carrying on, conducting or transaction of business." "Fraud" is
defined to include "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any
deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense,
false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions." 30 The leading
case under section 63(12) is Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc.,3 1 which involved
the sale of household appliances through the use of an "endless chain"
referral commission plan. Consumers agreed to pay exorbitant prices
for these items on the representation that their earnings from referral
commissions would be correspondingly high. Consumers were assured
that six to seven purchases would result from each ten names referred.
They were also guaranteed at least three hundred dollars if they referred the defendants to at least twenty persons who made appointments to discuss the plan. The collrC found that the plan involved a
series of fraudulent representations to consumers and constituted an
illegal lottery as well. In reality, the number of purchases resulting
from referrals was not assured and was far lower than the defendants
claimed. Moreover, if a customer was very far down the chain of referrals, he had a very slim chance of referring new prospects to the
defendant. Few customers earned enough commissions to pay for the
overpriced items they had bought in the belief that the purchase price
would not come out of their own pockets. The court enjoined the use
of this sales technique.
In another recent case under section 63(12), the Attorney General
succeeded in enjoining a more subtle selling pattern. In People v.
Compact Associates, 2 the defendant vacuum cleaner distributors used
door-to-door salesmen. In order to gain permission for a demonstration,
28 See id., Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A
Review of Its Consumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y.L.F. 603 (1965). For a general review
of consumer protection efforts by state attorneys general, see Developments in the LawDeceptive Advertising. 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1124-32 (1967).
29 N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 63(12). (15) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
0 Id. § 63(12).
81 52 Misc. 2d 39. 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
82 22 App. Div. 2d 129, 254 N.Y.52d 265 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiarn), afi'd mem.,
17 N.Y.2d 758, 217 N.E.2d 143, 270 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1966).
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the salesmen paid prospective buyers five dollars and gave them a "Bond
of Friendship," a document symbolizing friendly intentions. The
defendants' salesmen were found to have regularly followed this comeon with misrepresentations. A consumer was told, for example, that
no sale was contemplated but that a vacuum cleaner would be left

with him if he signed a receipt. The "receipt" was invariably an installment sale contract. The court enjoined not only the outright lying, but
also use of the Bond of Friendship and the payment for a demonstration, on the ground that the latter "created an atmosphere conducive
to fraud."33
The Compact Associates court seemed to consider that the number
of instances of probable consumer deception that could be shown by
the Attorney General was critical to establishing "persistent fraud." 34
Indeed, the dissent argued that only isolated acts of fraud had been
demonstrated. 35 A "numbers game" of this sort, which is invited by the
"persistent fraud" requirement, makes section 63(12) unduly expensive
and difficult to enforce. It should be sufficient for the Attorney General
to prove that continuous use of a sales technique is likely to deceive
consumers.3 6
Section 63(12) of the Executive Law interlocks with several other
statutory powers of the Attorney General. The section itself authorizes
him to issue subpoenas to ferret out persistent fraud. A recent amendment to the Civil Practice Law makes clear that these subpoenas can
be issued administratively without a court order.3 7 Moreover, section
63(15) authorizes the Attorney General to accept assurances of discontinuance in lieu of seeking an injunction under section 63(12).33 The
Attorney General may condition acceptance of such assurances on the
defendant's payment of up to two thousand dollars of the cost of investigation.3 9 Other conditions have also been imposed, such as the
Id. at 131, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
Id. at 131, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68.
Id. at 16-37, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 270-73.
38 See Lefkowitz v. ITM, inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 47-50, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303. 315-18 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
37 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 2302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967). The New York courts have
held that a subpoena issued under § 63(12) will be enforced as long as the subpoena has
"a reasonable relation to the subject-matter under investigation and to the public purpose
to be achieved." La Belle Creole International, S.A. v. Attorney General, 10 N.Y.2d 192.
196, 176 N.E.2d 705, 707, 219 N.Y.S2d i. 4 (1961), quoting Carlisle v. Bennet 268 N.Y.
212. 217, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935).
3S N.Y. ExEr. LAw § 63(15) (McKinney Supp. 1967). The Attorney General can also
accept assurances of discontinuance under other statutes. Id.
39 Id.; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 8303(6) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
33

34
35

1968]

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

deposit of funds in escrow for distribution to aggrieved consumers.40
Subsequent disregard of an assurance of discontinuance is prima facie
41
evidence of violation of section 63(12).
Section 63(12) is also tied into the Attorney General's power to
prohibit wayward corporations from doing business in New York. This
power is derived from the Business Corporation Law with respect to
corporations conducted for profit 42 and from the General Corporation
Law with respect to nonprofit corporations. 43 These statutes permit the
Attorney General to seek judicial dissolution of domestic corporations4 '
and to enjoin foreign corporations from doing intrastate business 5 if
they have operated in a "persistently fraudulent or illegal manner." In
appropriate cases, receivers can be appointed to safeguard the assets
of corporate offenders. 48 The Attorney General has made repeated use
of these broad powers, 47 and the landmark case of People v. Abbott
MaintenanceCorp.48 has confirmed that sustained deceptive advertising
is a basis for corporate dissolution.
The Attorney General's civil powers to stop persistent deceptive
advertising are not strikingly different from his civil powers to deal
40

Mindell, supra note 28, at 622 & n.116-17.

N.Y. EXEr. LAW § 63(15) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ l101(a)(2), 1303 (McKinney 1963).
43 N.Y. GN CORP. LAW §§ 91 (McKinney Supp. 1967). 219 (McKinney 1943). The
Business Corporation Law does not apply to nonprofit corporations. Hornstein, Analysis
of the Business Corporation Law, 6 McKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAws OF NEW YoLnx ANN.,
App. 1. at 442-43 (1963).
44 The Business Corporation Law mentions "persistently fraudulent or illegal" conduct, § 1101(a) (McKinney 1963), whereas the General Corporation Law refers to violations
of law that forfeit a charter and to abuses of powers that justify dissolution. N.Y. GEN.
CoRP. LAw § 91(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 196,.. Persistent fraud justices dissolution under
the General Corporation Law just as it does under the Business Corporation Law. People
v. Abbott Maint. Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Ist Dep't 1960), aff'd mer.,
9 N.Y.2d 810, 175 N.E.2d 341. 215 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1961). The General Corporation Law requires the Attorney General to seek judicial permission to institute such a proceeding
whereas the Business Corporation Law does not.
45 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1303 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 219 (McKinney 1943).
46 N.Y. Bus CoRP. LAW §§ 1113, 1202 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 96
41
42

(McKinney Supp. 1967), 150 (McKinney 1943).
47 E.g.. People v. B.C. Associates, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 43, 194 N.YS.2d 353 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (dissolution of a fraudulent disc jockey school); People v. Borg-Johnson Electronics.
Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 928, 176 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (requiring deposit of escrow funds
because of suspected fraudulent radio sales); People v. Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y,
196 Misc. 579, 92 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (restraining fund collecting in violation of
corporate charter); Lefkowitz, Protecting the Neuw York Consumer, 1961 CCH A'crritusr
Sm'oPslum 55, 59.
48 11 App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Ist Dep't 1960) (per curiam). afl'd mem..
9 N.Y.2d 810, 175 N.E.2d 341. 215 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1961).
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with the specialized problems of deceptive issuance and distribution of
'securities aid deceptive charitable solicitations. The most significant
disparity in approach is that certain issuers and distributors of securities, charitable organizations, professional fundraisers, and professional
solicitors must file specified information with state officials in order to
carry on business lawfully. The basic civil remedies for deceptive
marketing of securities and charitable solicitation are injunctive relief
against the deceptive practices and, in certain cases, the prohibition of
continued business in New York. 49 Nevertheless, there are some important differences between these remedies and the remedies generally
available to the Attorney General. With respect to deceptive practices
in the marketing of securities, for example, a temporary receiver can be
appointed who will only hold title to the property acquired as a result
of the deceptive practices. 50 Also, violation of an injunction against the
use of deceptive practices involving securities is both a crime and
grounds for imposition of a civil penalty of three thousand dollars. 51
Finally, the Attorney General can obtain an injunction more easily
under the statutes -dealing with the marketing of securities and charitable solicitations than under section 63(12) of the Executive Law.
Evidence of actual deception is unnecessary,52 and, at least with respect
to the marketing of securities, so is evidence of intention to deceive.53
Two other statutes invest the Attorney General with power over
deceptive advertising. Sections 350-350(e) of the General- Business Law
authorize him to recover a civil penalty of up to five hundred dollars
for 4ny advertisement that is misleading in a material respect.51' Finally,
section 396 of the General Business Law55 allows the Attorney General
-to enjoin "bait advertising," which occurs when a seller seeks to attract
cugtbmers by advertising at a low price an item he does not intend to
.49 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359(h) (McKinney 1968) (istuers and distributors of
LAw §§ 481-483(a) (McKinney 1966, Supp. 1967) (charitable
securities); N.Y. Soc. W=a
organizations, professional fund-raisers, professional solicitors).
50 N.Y. GEN. Brs. LAW .§,353(a) (McKinney 1968); see People v. Reinforced Paper
Bottle Corp., 176 Misc. 464, 26 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
51 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359(g)(1) (McKinney 1908).
52 Id. §§ 352, 352-c(l)(c), 353(1); N.Y. Soc. WE.AR LAW § 482-c(2)(c) (MeKinney
1966). With reSpect to securities, see People v. Electro Process, Inc., 284 App. Div. 833, 132
N.Y.S.2d'531 (4th Dep't 1954) (per curiam).
. 53 N.Y. GEN. BuS. LAW § 352-c(1)(c) (McKinrney 1968); People v, Federated Radio
Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38-41, 154 N.E. 655, 657-58 (1926).
54 NY. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 350-350(e) (McKinney 1968). It is a complete defense in
-such a proceedingthat an advertisement is .subject to, and complies with, the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 40-58 (1964). This is an emasculated version of the
statute originally recommended by the Special Committee.
55 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 396(1),(3) (McKinney 1968).
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sell in more than nominal amounts. A bait advertiser makes every
effort to sell unadvertised, higher-priced merchandise to persons who
respond to his advertisements. 68 Section 396(3) specifically negates
evidence of actual consumer deception as an element of enjoinable bait
57
advertising.
b. Criminal Remedies. The Attorney General shares general responsibility for the policing of deceptive advertising with the district
attorneys. Whereas the Attorney General's remedies are primarily
civil, 58 the district attorneys utilize their customary criminal proceedings. Section 190.20 of the Penal Law declares false advertising to be a
misdemeanor. The crime occurs when a person addresses an advertisement containing a false or misleading statement to a substantial number of persons with the intent of increasing the consumption of
property or services. Absen-e of conscious or reckless falsity will preclude a conviction.59 Although there are a host of other criminal
statutes condemning deceptive advertising, 60 section 190.20 is clea-ly the
most important. Its comprehensive terminology encompasses such
disparate practices as bait advertising 6' and advertisement of fictitious
price cuts. 6 2 Moreover, section 190.20 is the result of an evaluation of
the effectiveness of criminal sanctions against deceptive advertising. Experience with the predecessor of section 190.20 indicated, for instance,
that the courts would not rigorously enforce strict criminal liability
for deceptive advertising. 63 Consequently, section 190.20 makes actual
or probable awareness of falsity a necessary element of the crime where
the defendant has asserted his good faith.
56 See Note, State Control of Bat Advertising, 69 YALE L.J. 850, 832 (1960).
67 People v. Levinson, 23 Misc. 2d 483, 486, 199 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

58 The Attorney General is also specifically empowered to initiate some criminal
prosecutions. This is true, for example, with respect to deceptive practices in the marketing of securities, N.Y. GrN. Bus. LAw § 358 (McKinney 1968), and deceptive charitable
solicitations, N.Y. Soc. NVELFARE_ LAW §§ 482-c(l), 42-i(1) (McKinney 1966).
59 N.Y. P. A. LAw § 190.20 (McKinney 1967).
60 E.g., N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 224(l) (McKinney 1953) (deceptive advertising concerning

educational accreditation); N.Y. GEN. Bus LAw §§ 117 (deceptive advertising by travel
agents), 187(2) (employment agencies), 396(a) (savings and loan ass'ns) (McKinney 1968).
61 See People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959).
62 See People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1958).
63 Despite a Court of Appeals decision indicating that even innocent misrepresenta-

tion in connection with the sale of goods or services constituted a crime, People v.
Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 165-66, 51 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1943). lower courts con-

tinued to require evidence of intentional misrepresentation in order to sustain a conviction. See People v. Fleming, 273 App. Div. 1014, 78 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dzp'. 1948) (per

curiam). One prosecutor informed the Special Committee that conduct tantamount to
larceny had to be established in order to obtain a conviction for false advertising. SPECIAL
Comrm. REPogr 6a n.1 9 .
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c. Administrative Remedies. In addition to the Attorney General and the district attorneys, several state administrative agencies
have limited jurisdiction over deceptive advertising. The Insurance
Law forbids unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the insurance business. 64 "Unfair methods of competition" are defined to include violation of several other statutes, including section 190.20 of the Penal Law.65 The Superintendent of
Insurance has authority to issue cease and desist orders against unfair
or deceptive acts and practices.66 Temporary injunctions can also be
obtained if necessary.67 The Agriculture and Markets Law and the
Education Law similarly authorize the Commissioner of Agriculture
and Markets and the State Board of Pharmacy to prevent the use of
false advertisements and mislabeling in conjunction with the sale to
the public of food, 68 drugs, devices, and cosmetics. 69 Although violation of these latter statutes is a misdemeanor, 70 administrative regulation is the primary means of enforcement. The administrators have
authority to impose monetary penalties, 71 to seize misbranded or deceptively advertised products, 72 and to obtain injunctions against con-

tinuing violations.7"
2. False Disparagement
In contrast to the melange of civil, criminal, and administrative
public remedies for deceptive advertising, there are relatively few
statutes explicitly providing a public remedy for false disparagement.
One such statute is section 40-c of the Insurance Law, which makes it a
misdemeanor willfully and knowingly to circulate derogatory false statements that concern or affect the financial condition of insurance com§ 272 (McKinney 1966).
65 Id. § 273 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
66 Id. § 276 (McKinney 1966). A civil penalty of up to $5,000 can be imposed for
violation of a cease and desist order. Id. § 280.
67 Id. § 278(2).
68 N.Y. AGosc. & MKTs. LAW § 202-a (McKinney 1954), §§ 199-a, 201(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1967).
69 N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 6810(2)(a), 6821(2), (5), 6823(1) (McKinney 1953).
70 N.Y. AGoac. & MxTS. LAw § 41 (McKinney 1954); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6823(1) (Mc64 N.Y. INs. LAW

Kinney 1953).

71 N.Y. AGRic. & MKrTs. LAW § 39 (McKinney 1954); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6823(2)-(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1967).
72 N.Y. AGaic. & MKrs. LAw § 202-b (McKinney 1954); N.Y. Euc. LAw § 6815 (McKinney 1953).
78 N.Y. AG~ic. & MaTS. LAw § 202-c (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6824
(McKinney 1953). Carey v. Standard Brands, Inc., 16 Misc. 2d 874, 189 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Sup.
Ct. 1959), involved a suit for an injunction under the Agriculture and Markets Law.
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panies.74 Conduct violating this statute is also a deceptive practice
within the administrative jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Insurance. 75 However, a number of public remedies for deceptive advertising are broad enough to be applied to some forms of false disparagement. For example, a sales promotion scheme combining false
disparagement of competing goods or services with promotion of one's
own wares might also involve "persistent fraud" under section 63(12)
of the Executive Law,76 "false advertising" within the meaning of the
78
civil penalty law," 77 and criminal "false advertising."
3. Trade Symbol Infringement
The principal explicitly public remedies for trade symbol infringement are criminal. Section 279-n of the General Business Law, for
example, provides that it is a misdemeanor to make a false or counterfeit trademark, to deliberately affix a false or counterfeit trademark to
an article of merchandise, and intentionally to affix the genuine trademark of another to merchandise without the other's consent.7 9 There is
some overt administrative regulation of trade symbol infringement.
The Education Law, for instance, declares that drugs and cosmetics
bearing infringing trade symbols are "misbranded" and subject to regulation by the Board of Pharmacy.8 0 Trade symbol infringement may also
violate statutes regulating deceptive advertising. One of the misrepresentations enjoined in Lefkowitz v. ITM1Y, Inc.,"' a proceeding under
section 63 (12) of the Executive Law, was a false claim that the defendant Gilbert Industries was the famous toy manufacturer listed on
the New York Stock Exchange.
Another indirect public control over trade symbol infringement
is the authority of the Secretary of State with respect to deceptive
corporate names. The Business Corporation Law, which applies to
corporations operated for profit, and the General Corporation Law,
74

N.Y. INs. LAW § 40-c (McKinney Supp. 1967).

75 Id. § 273.
76 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1967); see Electrolux Corp. v. ValWorth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
77 "'[F]alse advertising' means advertising, including labeling, which is misleading in
a material respect ...." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 350(a) (McKinney 1968).
78 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20 (McKinney 1967); see People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461,
158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959). But see People v. Nessler, 198 App. Div. 362, 190
N.Y -,506 (1st Dep't 1921).
(79,'.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 279-n(1)-n(2) (McKinney 1968).
"8N.Y. Enuc. LAw §§ 6808(2)(h)(4), 6810(2)(d)(2), 6821(2) (McKinney 1953). The "bottling" acts dealing with improper use of refillable trademarked containers have particularly severe criminal penalties. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 275 to 279-i (McKinney 1968).
81 52 Misc. 2d 39, 46, 62, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 314, 329-30 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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which applies to nonprofit corporations, forbid the incorporation of
a domestic enterprise and the authorization of a foreign corporation
to do business with a name that is deceptively similar to that of a
corporation previously incorporated or authorized to do business in
New York.8 2 The prohibitions of the Business Corporation Law are
literally broader than those of the General Corporation Law, but
there is not much difference in their practical application. Barber &
Co. v. Department of State,8 3 a Court of Appeals decision under the
General Corporation Law, is the leading authority concerning the
factors to be weighed by the Secretary of State in administering these
statutes. Although the corporations were not competitors, the Secretary of State had found "The Barber Company, Inc." to be too similar to "Barber & Co., Inc." to permit the former's use. The Court of
Appeals upheld this decision, stating:
While the two corporate names are not the self-same thing,
both make pretty much the same appeal to eye and ear and neither
suggests any specific commercial activity. Both corporations are to
do business in the same locality. Though competition between
them may presently be unlikely, neither the financial advantage of
either nor the convenience of its customers was necessarily a conclusive factor. The duty of the 8Department
of State was a duty
4
to the public in the first instance.
When the New York statutes providing public remedies for deceptive advertising and false disparagement are compared to the statutes providing public remedies for trade symbol infringement, it besomes apparent that deceptive advertising has been regarded as the
more offensive deceptive trade practice in New York. More of the significant public-remedy statutes deal with deceptive advertising that with
the other deceptive practices. Furthermore, these statutes and the reported cases decided under them, do not begin to suggest the incidence
of deceptive advertising in New York. In 1965 the Attorney General's
82 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 301(a)(2) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 9 (McKinney Supp. 1967). There are Similar limitations on the names that can be adopted
through amendment of a certificate of incorporation or an authorization to do business.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 801(a) (McKinney 1963) 1308(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.Y.
GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 40(3) (McKinney Supp. 1967), 215 (McKinney 1043). The Business
Corporation Law also prohibits the filing of a name that is deceptively similar to a name
that has been reserved under that statute. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 301(a)(2) (McKinney
1963).
83 277 N.Y. 55, 12 N.E.2d 790 (1938).
84 Id. at 62, 12 N.E.2d at 793. The Barber rationale was followed under the Business
Corporation Law in Jervis Corp. v. Secretary of State, 43 Misc. 2d 185, 250 N.Y.S.2d 544
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection reported opening 9,492
files and claimed that its mediation and court action resulted in consumer returns of $1,213,482.56.85 In 1966 the figures were 14,678 files
and $1,064,627.A6 After analyzing similar data from an earlier period,
the Special Committee st-essed the imperative need to control deceptive
advertising: "We have concentrated on false advertising because we
are of the view that this constitutes the area in which the gravest
87
derelictions occur."
B. Statutes with Private Remedies
1. Express Statutory Remedies
In contrast to the statutes providing public remedies, the New York
statutes affording private remedies for deceptive trade practices relate
almost exclusively to trade symbol infringement. Like most states,
New York has a trade symbol registration statute,88 which permits registration of both non-infringing trademarks (trade symbols used to distinguish goods) and non-infringing service marks (trade symbols used
to distinguish services), provided that common law rights have been
acquired in the symbols.8 9 Registration is not required and does not
confer substantive advantages over nonregistrants.90 The primary benefits of registration are evidentiary and remedial. 1 A certificate of'registration can, for instance, provide valuable evidence of trade symbol use.
In Dunkin' Donuts of America, T7c. v. Dunkin' Donuts,Inc.,9 2 the court
adverted to the existence of a New York trade symbol registration as an
indication that the plaintiff's symbol deserved protection. The registration statute also authorizes a court to order destruction of infringing
85 N.Y.S. DEP'T OF LAw, 1965 ANN. RE. 12.
86 N.Y.S. DFP'T OF LAW, 1966 ANN. REP. 12.
87 SPECIAL Cotmm. REPORT 7.

88 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 860-368-e (McKinney 1968). There are also several trade
symbol registration statutes of more limited scope. E.g., id. §§ 209-a to 209-g (McKinney
1968) (hotel-motel name registration). These specialized statutes have been interpreted in
the same manner as the general trade symbol registration statute. See Thruway Motel v.
Heilman Motel Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 418, 170 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct, 1958).
89 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 860-a(a-1), 361 (McKinney 1968). Common law rights are
not recognized in descriptive symbols without evidence that the public associates the
symbols with a particular user. Id. 361-e, see R. DoLE, supra note 16, at 6-8. The New
York registration statute provides that continuous use of a descriptive symbol for five
years is evidence of "distinctive" use. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw. § 861-e(3) (McKinney 1968).
00 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 868-e (McKinney 1968).
91 Cf. Note, Statutory Treatment of the Model State Trademark Bill in the Areas
of Service Marks and Conflicting FederalRegistrations,27 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 353, 354-55

(1959).
92 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 188 W.Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep't 1959).
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matter, a remedy not necessarily available at common law. 93 Nevertheless, the private remedies for infringement of a registered trade
symbol are essentially the same as those for infringement of an un-

registered trade symbol: an injunction, damages, and, in the discre-

94
tion of the court, recovery of the profits derived from infringement.

On the other hand, section 133 of the General Business Law contains a truly distinctive remedy for trade symbol infringement. Section

133 deals with misleading indications of location and trade symbols
that can mislead the public concerning the identity of a person or his
connection with another person. If a respondent intended to deceive
the public in this fashion, section 133 authorizes injunctive relief on
five days' notice. Proof of actual public deception is unnecessary. 95
In Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi,96 the Court of Appeals

determined that section 133 authorized a special proceeding. 97 Initiated by service of a notice of petition, a petition, and any supporting
affidavits, 9 a section 133 proceeding can be decided upon papers
alone.9 9 In close cases, however, some judges hear the arguments of
counsel 0 0 and even the testimony of witnesses. 0 1 The injunction that
can be granted on five days' notice is a final order and not an injunction pendente lite. 10 2
The resemblance of a section 133 proceeding to summary judgment has not escaped the attention of the New York courts. One judge

has commented: "[T]he proof by affidavit and absence of factual issue
must be tantamount to that which would authorize a summary judg93 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-c(l) (McKinney 1968); see Note, supra note 91, at 855.

94 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-c (McKinney 1968).
95 Id. § 133. See generally Alexander, A Summary Civil Remedy for Trade Name
Infringement: The New York Experience, 53 TRADEmAm RE'. 17 (1963). Violation of
§ 133 is also a misdemeanor, but the criminal significance of the statute is negligible.
96 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E.2d 874 (1940).
97 Julius Restaurant and the following cases discussed in connection with § 133 were
decided under the predecessor to § 133, former Penal Law § 964, reprinted in 89 McKrNNEY'S CONsoLmATn LAws oF N.Y. ANN., app. at 468 (1967). Section 133 became effective
September 1, 1967, and is substantially indentical to former Penal Law § 964.
98 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 403(b) (McKinney 1963). The notice of petition must be
served in the same manner as a summons. Id. § 403(c).
99 In re Playland Holding Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 303, 135 N.E.2d 202, 203, 152 N.Y.S.2d
462, 464 (1956).
100 See In re Precision Apparatus Co., 6 Misc. 2d 817, 165 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
101 See In re Allen Carpet Cleaning & Rug Weaving Co., 29 Misc. 2d 205, 212 N.Y.S.2d
314 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
102 Association of Contracting Plumbers, Inc. v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n, 197
Misc. 158, 94 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd mem., 277 App. Div. 840, 97 N.Y..2d 787
(1st Dep't 1950), rew'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y. 495, 99 N.EX2d 542 (1951).
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ment ..... 103 This is generally understood to mean that a petitioner

must make out the elements of a section 133 violation, especially the
respondent's intent to mislead the public, by clear and convincing
evidence. 0 4 However, if a petitioner's papers establish a prima facie
case, the respondent must do more than traverse the petition. Insubstantial or incredible averments and bare denials of intentional misconduct are insufficient to defeat a section 133 proceeding.0 5
Unlike a section 133 proceeding, a common law action for trade
symbol infringement can be brought even if the defendant had no
intention to mislead the public. 0 6 This substantive distinction, reinforced by section 133's unique procedure, has led most New York
courts to distinguish sharply between section 133 proceedings and
plenary actions for trade symbol infringement. Matter of Dictograph
Products Co. v. Brooklyn Auralfone Corp.,10 7 for example, held that a

section 133 proceeding could not be combined with a plenary action.
As a matter of practice, the summary proceeding is brought first, and,
if summary relief is denied due to a failure to establish intentional
misconduct, a plenary action may be initiated. 10 8
A few judges, however, have repudiated the distinction between
section 133 proceedings and plenary actions. In Wilma Gowns, Inc.
103 In re Industrial Plants Corp., 286 App. Div. 568, 571, 146 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (1st Dep't

1955).
104 Association of Contracting Plumbers, Inc. v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n, 302 N.Y.
495, 99 N.E.2d 542 (1951); Charles F. Ryan & Son v. Lancaster Homes, Inc., 19 App. Div.
2d 14, 240 N.YS.2d 183 (4th Dep't 1963).
105 In re Playland Holding Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 303, 135 N.E.2d 202, 203, 152 N.Y.S.2d
462, 464 (1956).
106 David B. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay, 18 N.Y.2d 12, 218 N.E.2d 531, 271 N.Y.S.2d 652,
modified on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 676, 219 N.E.2d 872, 273 N.Y.S.2d 422, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966); Comment, Unfair Competition: Injunctive Relief and the Personal
Name Exception, 51 MINN. L. REv. 782 (1967).
107 20 Misc. 2d 877, 195 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
108 Charles F. Ryan & Son v. Lancaster Homes, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 14, 240 N.Y.S.2d
183 (4th Dep't 1963), illustrates this procedural sequence. The case arose out of an endeavor by Ryan Homes, Inc., a Pennsylvania house builder, to enter the housing market
in Rochester, New York. Charles F. Ryan & Son, local housing contractors, brought a
§ 13 proceeding to restrain use of the trade symbol "Ryan" in the Rochester area by the
Pennsylvania firm. Although the petitioners prevailed in the trial court, the appellate
division reversed and gave the petitioners the following advice:
In the absence of a dear demonstration that the appellants intended to trade
upon and exploit the petitioners' reputation, the petitioners' claim for relief
under section 964 of the Penal Law [the statutory predecessor of § 133] falls...
... The petitioners' proper remedy is a plenary action in equity.
rd. at 19, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 187-88. This turned out to be bad advice on the facts of the
Ryan case. The complaint in the plenary action was subsequently dismissed on the merits.
Charles F. Ryan & Son v. Lancaster Homes, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 186, 254 N.Y.S.2d 473
(4th Dep't 1964).
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v. Wilma Juniors, Inc.,'- 9 the papers filed by the parties indicated
that the respondent's trade symbol would be confused with the petitioner's trade symbol but did not establish the respondent's intent to
mislead the public. Faced with a good common law claim that did
not justify summary relief in a section 133 proceeding, the trial judge
granted an injunction in the interests of justice rather than require
the petitioner to bring a plenary action.
Section 133 is violated by the intentional use of a trade symbol
that is likely to mislead the public concerning one person's connection with another."0 The statute is thus broad enough to encompass
the concept of confusion of sponsorship, which -is a newer form of
trade symbol infringement that involves a false implication of endorsement, approval, or certification of a product, service, or business
by another business."' In Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v.
Karnell,'112 the New York affiliate of the AAA successfully brought a
section 133 proceeding against a tow truck operator who had displayed the AAA symbol on his tow truck without authorization.
New York's privacy statute" 3 also applies to some forms of confusion of sponsorship. The statute permits any person whose name,
portrait, or picture is used for advertising or for purposes of trade
without his written consent to sue for an injunction and damages.
If the defendant's conduct is found to be intentional, the jury can
also award exemplary damages. 114 In Adrian v. Unterman,"5 a wellknown women's dress designer was held entitled under the privacy
statute to enjoin unauthorized use of his personal name in connection with the sale of perfume. Nonetheless, the privacy statute reflects
109 82 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
110 No person, firm or corporation shall, with intent to deceive or mislead the
public, assume, adopt or use as, or as part of, a corporate, assumed or trade name,
for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade, or for any other purpose,
any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof, or a part of
any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof, which may
deceive or mislead the public . . . as to the connection of such person, firm or
corporation with any other person, firm or corporation.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. Lw § 133 (McKinney 1968).
111 Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Karnell, 19 Misc. 2d 857, 191 N.Y.S.2d 649
(Sup. Ct. 1959). Cf. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div.
2d 228, 188 N.Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep't 1959). See Dole, supra note 21, at 1014.
112 19 Misc. 2d 857, 191 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
113 N.Y. CIVIL RJIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948).
114 Id. § 51. The basic privacy statute makes this form of invasion of privacy a misdemeanor. Id. § 50.
115 281 App. Div. 81, 118 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 771, 118
N.E,2d 477 (1954); accord, Orsini v. Eastern Wine Corp., 190 Misc. 235, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 273 App. Div. 947, 78 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1st Dep't 1948).
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concern for the preservation of human dignity, 116 and its confusionof-sponsorship overtones have been limited correspondingly. Unauthorized use of another's assumed business name" 7 or partnership name1 "
has been held not to violate the statute.
The New York trade symbol registration act contains an important provision that is applicable to both registered and unregistered
trade symbols. Section 368-d states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground
for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered
or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services." 9
This statute codifies the antidilution theory of trade symbol protection. Frank I. Schechter, the trade symbol specialist credited with
popularizing the antidilution theory in this country, summarized his
position as follows:
(1) . . [[T]he value of the modem trademark lies in its selling
power; (2) ...this selling power depends for its psychological hold
upon the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon
which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity; (3) .. .such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired by its use upon either related or non-related goods; and (4)
the degree of its protection depends, in turn upon the extent
to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from other marks.
Our conclusion [is] that the preservation of the uniqueness of
a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection ....120
Schechter's theory protects the "conditioned reflex produced by
persuasive advertising,"' 21 and has been criticised incisively by Professor Ralph Brown. Professor Brown observes that trade symbols can
perform at least five functions. They can simultaneously signify (1)
the source of goods or services, (2) the reputation of that source, (3)
116 See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 985-91 (1964).
117 Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 176 Misc. 88, 26 NY.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd
per curiam, 265 App. Div. 15, 87 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ist Dep't 1942) (alternative holding).
118 Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N.Y.S. 56 (2d Dep't 1916).
119 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968).
120 Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAv. L. REv. 813,
881 (1927).
121 Deering, Trademarks on Non-Competitive Products, 36 ORE. L. RLv. 1, 25 (1956).
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consumer satisfaction with prior goods or services bearing the same
symbols, (4) a conditioned reflex induced by persuasive advertising,
and (5) intrinsic symbol value. 1 22 Brown argues that only the first three
of these functions deserve legal protection because they alone serve
significant consumer interests. He favors protecting trade symbol functions that inform consumers about the nature of goods or services,
and withholding protection from trade symbol functions that are intimately linked with persuasive advertising. Brown thus rejects out
3
of hand the antidilution theory of trade symbol protection.1
The judicial response to the New York antidilution statute has
been more in accord, with the views of Professor Brown than with
those of Mr. Schechter. Judges cannot altogether ignore the statute if
it is applicable, but preservation of the uniqueness of a trade symbol
seems, at most, to have become an additional interest to be weighed
in determining whether trade symbol infringement exists. 24 This result is actually invited by the antidilution statute, which states that
"[1l]ikelihood of . . . dilution . . . shall be a ground for injunctive
relief .... "125
New York has granted relatively liberal protection to trade symbols for some time 12 and the antidilution statute was enacted in 1954
at the urging of lawyers who believed that the Second Circuit was
interpreting New York law too restrictively.12 7 The federal courts,
however, have remained cool to the antidilution theory notwithstanding the New York statute. In 1962 Judge Bonsal dismissed a statutory
dilution claim with the comment that "[t]he doctrine has been given
little weight in the Second Circuit."1 23sFurthermore, the New York
cases have begun to reflect the Second Circuit position. In a leading
122 Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,

57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1184-1206 (1948). Brown restricted his analysis to trade symbols used to
distinguish goods, but, as the above text indicates, the analysis is equally applicable to
trade symbols used to distinguish services.
123 Id. at 1191-94.
124 Compare Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The-Wisp?, 77

HAv. L. Rav. 520, 529-32 (1964), with Pickett, Anti-Dilution Litigation in the United
States, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 785, 794-98, 800-04 (1965).
125 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 568-d (McKinney 1968) (emphasis added); Note, supra note
124, at 529. For text of the statute, see p. 767 supra.
126 E.g., Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176
(Sup. Ct. 1937); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y.S. 821 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd mem., 262 N.Y.
482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
127 1954 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 49-51 (memorandum of the Federal Bar
Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut).
128 Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally Pickett, supra note 124, at 795-96.
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New York decision, Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,129
the publisher of Cue Magazine, a New York metropolitan entertainment guide, sought to enjoin Colgate from marketing a stannous
fluoride toothpaste called "Cue." The case had some of the classic
attributes of dilution. Although "cue" was a dictionary word, it did
not suggest either an entertainment guide or a toothpaste. Furthermore, the plaintiff was the senior user of the term in New York and
contended that the down-to-earth, cavity-fighting connotations of a
toothpaste would muddy the image of sophistication that had been
cultivated for its magazine.
Nonetheless, the trial judge dismissed the complaint, stressing
that the defendant was in no way trying to cash in on the plaintiff's
reputation and that toothpaste was so unlike an entertainment guide
that there could be no significant dilution. 30 The appellate division
affirmed on the ground that, despite "some dilution," it would be
inequitable to grant relief after the plaintiff had slept on its rights
while the defendant had spent considerable money developing and
introducing "Cue" toothpaste. 31
The Cue case has been influential. Two federal district courts
have recently relied on it for the proposition that the antidilution
statute is not violated without evidence that the public is apt to confuse the defendant with the plaintiff or that the defendant has an unfair intent.3 2 Because the antidilution statute expressly makes lack of
competition and confusion between the parties irrelevant and does
not refer to wrongful intent, 38 this interpretation, like that applied
in Cue itself, manifests judicial distaste for strong antidilution protection. Several other decisions, however, have invoked the statute in
order to justify relief where confusion of sponsorship was apparent. 13 4
In James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara,3 5 for example, the manufacturer
of "Beefeater" gin, who had licensed several restaurants to use the
129 45 Misc. 2d 161, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 23 App. Div. 2d
829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1965).
130 Id. at 167-70, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 245-47.
131 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
132 Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928, 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Field Enterprises Educ. Corp. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 382, 890-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Bonsai, J.).
133 N.Y. Gmu. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968); see p. 767 supra.
'34 Greyhound Corp. v. Greyhound Sec., Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 303, 207 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup.
Ct. 1960); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(involving use of the name "Maxim's" in the restaurant business).
135 8 Misc. 2d 819, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1957) The court indicated, however,
that defendant's use of the name, "The Beefer," was permissible.
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"Beefeater" name, was held entitled to enjoin unauthorized use of
the name "The Beefeater" by another restaurant.
The antidilution statute contains a discrete phrase declaring that
conduct that results in a "likelihood of injury" to the business reputation of a trade symbol is also a ground for injunctive relief, notwithstanding the absence of competition or confusion between the parties. 3 6 To some extent, this language constitutes a broad-gauged
codification of a trade symbol user's interest in avoiding tarnishment
37
of his trade symbol's reputation by a disreputable concurrent user.1
The provision, however, has other significant applications. In Wertheimer v. Milliken,138 for example, a trade symbol user enjoined a
third party from reselling the former's over-age, trademarked X-ray
film as usable film, and, in Clairol,Inc. v. L. H. Martin Value Center,
Inc.,139 a trade symbol user enjoined a third party from offering the
former's trademarked goods to the public without adequate instructions concerning their use. 140 Both decisions could be considered deceptive advertising cases. Moreover, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Ltd.
v. Restaurant Cherry Lane, Inc.,'4 1 a trade symbol user obtained an
injunction restraining a restaurant owner from displaying signs that
falsely asserted that the plaintiff's whiskey was mislabeled. Although
the judge did not expressly rely on the statutory "injury to business
reputation" count in the Seagram complaint, he did allude to it. Seagram therefore implies that the New York antidilution statute authorizes injunctive relief against false disparagement that brings a trade
symbol into disrepute. 14 2 This implication, however, has yet to be
translated into solid precedent. 143
36 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968); see p. 767 supra.
137 See Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 613-14 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 3864 U.S. 909 (1960).
138 123 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
139 40 Misc. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (alternative holding); accord,
Clairol, Inc. v. Carlton Drug, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 652, 278 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dep't 1967)
(mem.).
140 The Martin Value Center case grants harsh relief in requiring the defendant to
supply the plaintiff's instructions to the defendant's customers. It should be sufficient to
.require disclosure that these instructions should be obtained and followed in the use of
the product. See Clairol, Inc. v. Cody's Cosmetics, Inc.
Mass.
,
, 231
N.E.2d 912, 918 (1967).
141 118 U.S.P.Q. 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
142 Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes,
44 CALw. L. REv, 439, 481-82 (1956).
143 Symposium, "Honest" Truth or Unfair Competition?, 58 TRAEMARx REP. 225,

286 & n.89 (1963) (remarks of Werner Janssen, Jr.)..
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2. Implied Private Remedies
In addition to the numerous statutes creating express private
remedies for trade symbol infringement, some statutes providing public
remedies for infringement have, been considered by the New York
courts to permit judicial implication of equivalent private actions. The
leading case is Lanvin Parfums, Inc. v. LeDans, Ltd.,' 44 which arose
under what is now section 279-n(6) of the General Business Law. This
statute states that a person who
[k]nowingly sells, offers or exposes for sale, any goods which are
represented in any manner, by word or deed, to be the manufacture, packing, bottling, boxing or product of any person, firm or
corporation, other than himself, unless such goods are contained in
the original package, box or bottle and under the labels, marks or
names placed thereon by the manufacturer who is entitled to use
such marks, names, brands or trade-marks ...

demeanor1 45

is guilty of a mis-

The plaintiff in Lanvin was an importer of French perfumes and perfume extracts who either sold his French products in their original
packages or rebottled them as toilet waters and sold them under his
own trade symbols. The defendants purchased the plaintiff's products,
rebottled them in smaller bottles than those used by the plaintiff,
and undercut the plaintiff's prices on resale. Because the defendants'
labels allegedly proclaimed that the products were the plaintiff's perfumes and toilet waters, but the goods were not in the plaintiff's original containers, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complainant
stated a violation of section 279-n(6). The use of the plaintiff's trade
symbol in the commission of this crime was then held to entitle the
plaintiff to enjoin the defendants' conduct regardless of whether anyone was actually misled.
Lanvin constitutes a square holding that a private action can be
implied from section 279-n(6) of the General Business Law. In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 146 Mr. Justice Holmes committed the United
States Supreme Court to the proposition that it is not trade symbol
infringement for a rebottler to disclose the source of his products as
long as he also prominently discloses the fact of rebottling. The Prestonettes decision has been so influential that it might well have been
considered to represent New York law in Lanvin in the absence of
144 9 N.Y.2d 516, 174 N.E.2d 920, 215 N.Y,S.2d 257, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 834 (1961).
145 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 279-n(6) (McKinney 1968).
146 264 U.S. 359 (1924).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:749

the criminal statute. 4 7 Several recent cases have followed Lanvin and
allowed a trade symbol user to enjoin subsequent vendors from altering the packaging of his trademarked goods in a manner that would
48
transgress section 279-n(6).1
Another Court of Appeals decision imposes private liability for
violation of a public remedy statute dealing with deceptive advertising. Section 188 of the Agriculture and Markets Law forbids the delivery of fewer goods than the seller represented to sell. 49 In Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co.,'-' a grocer sought to recover damages
from a vendor of olive oil for the penalties and counsel fees incurred
because the defendant's containers did not contain as much olive oil
as they were represented to hold. The Court of Appeals concluded that
section 188 and several related provisions of the predecessor of the
Agriculture and Markets Law impliedly imposed strict liability, re-

gardless of privity, on sellers who mislabeled the quantity of the food
they sold and sustained the sufficiency of the grocer's complaint. Perhaps because of its strict liability theory, the Abounader principle
has not beer applied to the general public remedy statutes that condemn deceptive advertising that is beyond the ambit of the Agriculture and Markets Law,' 5 ' or even to the general provisions of the
152
Agriculture and Markets Law that forbid deceptive advertising.
Abounader constitutes a limited judicial effort to make private
as well as public remedies available for deceptive advtrtising. Still
another Court of Appeals decision, Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth,

Inc.,'-' takes the same approach concerning bait advertising that is i.
tertwined with false disparagement. The defendants' sales technique in
Electrolux began with television advertisements for rebuilt Electrolux
vacuum cleaners at attractive prices. On the pretext of explaining the
offer, salesmen would gain entrance to potential customers' homes and
147 See Lanvin Parfums, Inc. v. Le Dans, Ltd., 12 App. Div. 2d 104, 208 N.Y.S.2d 675
(1st Dep't 1960), rev'd 9 N.Y.2d 516, 174 N.E.2d 920, 215 N.Y.S.2d 257, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 834 (1961; Note, Sale of Rebottled Goods Under Label Referring to Original Trademark Violates New York Penal Code, 37 N.Y.U.L REv. 338 (1962).
148 E.g., Clairol, Inc. v. L.H. Martin Value Center, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d
210 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (alternative holding).
149 N.Y. Acuc. & MK-rs. LAw § 188 (McKinney 1954). The principal statutory sanctions for violation of § 188 are conviction of a misdemeanor, id. § 41, administrative imposition of a monetary penalty. id. § 39, and an injunction. Id. § 38.
150 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926).
151 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Pub. Co., 118 Misc. 789, 195 N.Y.S. 37 (Sup. Ct.
1922) (antecedent of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.2'. (McKinney 1967)). But see Electrolux Corp.
v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
152 E.g., N.Y. Acsuc. & Mrs. LAW.y § 202-a (McKinney 1954).
153 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E-2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
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then proceed to sell new, more expensive machines produced by other
manufacturers through false disparagement of the rebuilt Electrolux
vacuum cleaners. The Court of Appeals held that Electrolux, the manufacturer of the "bait," was entitled to enjoin the defendants' scheme
and to recover damages for any losses it had suffered. Chief Judge
Conway justified this conclusion by reference to two public remedy
statutes that could have been invoked against the defendants: the
criminal false advertising statute, 15 4 and section 396 of the General
Business Law, which allows the Attorney General to initiate proceedings to enjoin bait advertising.' 55 According to Judge Conway,
these statutes were important because, "if defendants' methods are
deceitful and run contrary to accepted business ethics, the public
policy of the State is relevant, though perhaps not decisive, in evaluating a claim of unfair competition."' 5
Judge Conway's statement helps to bring the Lanvin, Abounader,
and Electrolux cases into perspective. The Court of Appeals has not
regarded the administrative powers of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, the ability of the Attorney General to obtain an
injunction, or the ability of district attorneys to bring criminal proceedings as precluding a private remedy for deceptive trade practices.
Instead, public remedy statutes have been treated as some evidence of
the need for a corresponding private remedy. Nonetheless, the Court
has proceeded with circumspection and has only implied private remedies from a few public remedy statutes of limited scope. The upshot is
that only trade symbol infringement is adequately treated by private
remedy statutes in New York. There are virtually no express statutory
private remedies for deceptive advertising or false disparagement, and
the few private remedies that have been implied from public remedy
statutes have a narrow range.
The trade symbol orientation of New York's private remedy
statutes contrasts with the deceptive advertising emphasis of its public
remedy statutes. In view of the incidence of deceptive advertising in
New York, 57 an effective private remedy against deceptive advertising
is needed. Although the incidence of false disparagement in New York
is not as well documented as that of deceptive advertising, its probable frequency' 55 and the paucity of legislation dealing with false dis154 The predecessor of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20 (McKinney 1967).
155 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 396(1), (3) (McKinney 1968).
156 Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 568, 161 N.E.2d 197, 204, 190
N.Y.S.2d 977, 987 (1959).
157 See pp. 754-60 supra.
158 See Symposium, supra note 143, at 273-303.
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paxagement suggest an equivalent need for an effective private remedy. The various public remedies that can be applied to deceptive
advertising and false disparagement do not materially alter the situation. Largely for budgetary reasons, state officials typically initiate
formal proceedings only against deceptive conduct that materially
affects the public or is outrageously flagrant. 159 Although public officials also engage in informal'mediation of consumer complaints, 160
emphasis on this kind of activity can fritter away valuable resources
that could more profitably be committed to bringing legal proceedings against major offenders.1 61 In any event, the number of offenders
is so large that private as well as public remedies should be brought
to bear against deceptive advertising and false disparagement. Professor Starrs has suggested that the "courts could take judicial, notice of
the present inability of the FTC, consumer fraud bureaus and offices
of the attorneys general of the various states to cope with the ever162
pyramiding evidence of fraud in more and more industiies."'
C. Common Law Principles
The New York common law principles concerning deceptive advertising, false disparagement, and trade symbol infringement leave
much to be desired. Like the statutes containing express private remedies, these principles deal most adequately with trade symbol infringement.
1. Deceptive Advertising
New York adheres to the traditional common law view that deceptive advertising is not ordinarily actionable unless the plaintiff has a
monopoly over the subject of the defendant's deceptive advertising 6
or the deceptive advertising involves misuse of a geographical term
and the truthful users of the term confine the relief sought to an in159 See People v. Compact Associates, Inc.,-22 App. Div. 2d 129, 254 NY.S.2d 265 (1st
Dep't 1964) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 758, 217 N.E.2d 143, 270 N.Y.S.2d 420
(1966); Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Dole,
supra note 21, at 1029.
160 E.g., N.Y.S. DEP'T OF LAw, 1966 ANN. REP. 12-13.
161 Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1132-33
(1967).
162 NATIONAL INsTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAw AND

§R
74: 1,

POVERTY, HANDBOOK

ON

CON-

at 5 (1st ed. 1968).
\Ju
e Research Labs., Inc. v. General Resistance, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 634, 268
N.Y.S2d- T7 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 996, 227 N.E.2d 892, 281
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1967); see Quinby & Co. v. Funston, 13 Misc. 2d 134, 135-39, 177 NY.S.2d
736, 737-40 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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junction. 1 4 The stunted growth of this tort in New York, as in most
states, is primarily attributable to the difficulty of devising a concept of
standing to sue that will right the most serious wrongs, yet preclude
vexatious litigation. So many persons can be at least colorably injured
by deceptive advertising that it is difficult to know who should be allowed to sue and who should not. 16 5 The common law response to this
situation is to deny standing to most persons. 66
2. False Disparagement
Evidence of special damage is a prerequisite to the recovery of
damages for false disparagement in New York. In Drug Research Corp.
v. Curtis Publishing Co.,16 7 the court of Appeals stated:
Giving the pleading its most favorable construction, namely,
that it states a libel on the product, it nonetheless must be dismissed for failure to allege special damages ...... special damage
must be fully and accurately stated. If the special damage was a loss
of customers ... the persons who ceased to be customers, or who
refused to purchase, must be named .... [I]f they are not named,
no cause of action is stated.' "168
The extent to which special damage is also a prerequisite to equitable relief is less clear. At first blush, it might seem that special damage should not be required in order to obtain equitable relief for false
disparagement. The ability to prove special damage is, after all, evidence that a complainant's remedy at law is adequate. By the same
token, an inability to prove the losses that were caused by conduct
having a detiiite capacity to injure is evidence that a complainant's
remedy at law is inadequate and that equitable relief is in order. 6 9
Nevertheless, the New York law governing equitable relief against false
disparagement bears out Holmes's dictum that the life of the law has
been experience rather than logic. 17
n a
In the celebrated case of Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields,M
164 E.g., Schweizerishe Kaeseunion Bern v. Saul Starck, Inc., 162 Misc. 485, 293 N.Y.S.
816 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (Swiss cheese); Douglas v. Mod-Urn Cheese Packing Co., 161 Misc. 21.
290 N.YS. 368 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (Roquefort cheese).
165 See New York & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277, 278 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1890).
166 See Dole, supra note 12, at 662-69.
167 7 N.Y.2d 435, 166 N.E.2d 319, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1960).
168 Id. at 440-41, 166 N.E.2d at 322, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 37. (footnotes omitted)
169 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 68 App. Div. 88, 74 N.Y.S. 84 (Ist Dept). rev'd.
171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
170 0. W. Horasr~s, THi CO.MON LAw 5 (Howe ed. 1-o63).
171 171 N.Y. 384. 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
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firearms manufacturer sued to enjoin the publisher of a sportsmen's
magazine from printing sham letters-to-the-editor that discredited the
plaintiff's rifles. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but was reversed by the appellate division. 17 2 The Court of
Appeals reinstated the demurrer on the alternative ground that the
alleged falsity and perversity of the defendant's conduct was immaterial in the absence of an allegation of special damage. The Court declared: "We need not stop to consider the reason for the rule [requiring special damage] for it has been too long and too firmly established
to admit of questioning at this day." 173
Although the Court also alluded to the shibboleth that "equity
will not enjoin a libel" and to free speech considerations, 7 4 this
aspect of Marlin has become pass6. In the 1959 case of Electrolux
Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc.,7; the Court of Appeals approved an injunction against a bait advertising scheme that was predicated upon false
disparagement of the bait. New York has thus accepted the modern
view which acknowledges equitable jurisdiction with respect to false
disparagement and considers that free speech issues are relevant only
178
to the grant or denial of relief in particular instances.
The vitality of the special damage requirement of Marlin is less
obvious. In Electrolux the Court of Appeals dismissed the appellate
division's concern with the absence of proof of specific loss of trade' 77
with the comment that "respondents' acts of unfair competition are
to be distinguished from disinterested acts of trade libel."'' 7 To understand this distinction it must be borne in mind that Electrolux involved a suit between businessmen, a vacuum-cleaner manufacturer
and a vacuum-cleaner reconditioner and retailer, and that the wrongful conduct consisted of the defendants' use of the reconditioned machines in a bait adverti' ;ng scheme.' 79 The other two cases cited by
Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 68 App. Div. 88, 74 N.Y.S. 84 (Ist Dep't 1902).
Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 391, 64 N.E. 163, 165 (1902).
174 Id. at 389-96, 64 N.E. at 165-67.
175 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959); see p. 772 supra.
176 E.g., Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc., 334 Mass. 86, 134
N.E.2d 1, cert. denied. 352 U.S. 848 (1956); Mayfair Farms, Inc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
68 N.J. Super. 188, 195-96, 172 A.2d 26, 29-30 (Ch. 1961); Developments in the Lau'-Com.
petitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 902-05 (1964).
177 Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 216, 220, 170 N.Y.S.2d 738,
742 (Ist Dep't 1958).
178 Elect.alux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc.. 6 N.Y.2d 556. 571, 161 N.E.2d 197, 205. 190
N.Y.S.2d 977, 989 (1959).
179 Because the plaintiff had supplied the defendants with used Electrolux vacuum
cleaners for a considerable period of time, the Court of Appeals concluded that the plain172
173
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the Court of Appeals as depicting the kind of "interested trade libel"
that had no special damage requirement also involved businessmen.
Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co. 80 was a suit by a face-powder manufacturer against a retail drug chain. Allen Manufacturing Co. v.
8 1 was a suit between rival manufacturers of cattle fly-spray.
Smith"
On the other hand, of the three cases mentioned by the Court of Appeals as illustrating situations in which proof of special damage was
necessary, two were suits against communications media, a newspaper
and a magazine,' 8 2 and the third was a suit against a private individual. 8 Thus, Electrolux apparently dispenses with special damage
as a predicate to equitable relief for false disparagement only if both
parties are businessmen who deal in commodities or services rather
than ideas. In other words, the Court of Appeals has seemingly retained
Marlin's special damage requirement in situations where the grant of
relief is most likely to raise free speech issues. 8 4
Use of a special damage requirement as a tacit buffer for the first
amendment is unwise. Electrolux indicates that a special damage requirement exists in every noncommercial false disparagement case
regardless of whether the first amendment actually is a bar to equitable relief. Marlin, for instance, was one of the Court of Appeals' examples of the "disinterested trade libel," which requires evidence of
special damage. Yet, the complaint in Marlin alleged that the defendant magazine publisher was disparaging the plaintiff's rifles through
false and unfounded comments contained in fake letters-to-the-editor. 8 5 Marlin was decided in 1902, long before New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,"' but the allegations in Marlin could satisfy the New York
Times test for the "actual malice" that is constitutionally sufficient to
render public speech actionable. 87 If the firearm manufacturer's evitiff was estopped to complain of the defendants' reconditioning activities. Id. at 564-65, 161
N.E.2d at 201, 190 N.Y.S2d at 983-84.
180 82 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
181 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (4th Dep't 1928).
182 Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 186 N.Y. 437, 79
N.E. 710 (1906); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
183 Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N.Y.S. 219 (4th Dep't 1925).
184 Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see Developments in the LawCompetitive Torts, supra note 176, at 902-05.
185 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 386-88, 64 N.E. 163-64 (1902).
186 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
187 The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits

a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
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dence supported his allegations, a trier of fact could have found that
the magazine publisher knew that his charges were false. 88 His bogus
letters were so specific in their criticisms of Marlin rifles that the
author-publisher seemed knowledgeable about guns and in A,position
to know whether or not his comments were true.
Thus far the Supreme Court has applied thie New York Tilnes
test to defamation of public officials 'i 9 defamation of public figures, 190
and invasions of privacy involving matters of public interest.i' l Although that Court has not yet extended the test to false disparagement
involving matters of public interest,19 the probability that the alleged
facts in Marlin could justify imposition of liability under the New
York Times test-the most stringent constitutional limitation on tort
liability apt to be applied to false disparagement' 93 -underscores the
inexpediency of imposing a special damage prerequisite to equitable
relief from all "disinterested trade libel." 9 4
The deficiencies of the Electrolux approach are compounded by
the absence of a sharp distinction between "interested" and "disin188 The Supreme Court has not decided whether a jury trial is constitutionally
necessary in cases to which the New York Times test applies. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 874 (1967). But the absence of such a constitutional requirement with respect
to obscenity suggests it is not. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 443 (1957); cf. id. at 447-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
190 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
191 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 74 (1967).
192 Some lower courts have endorsed application of the New York Times test in
situations in which an action for false disparagement could lie. All Diet Foods Distribs.,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 36 U.S.L.W. 2894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 1968) (operator of a health-fbod
retail store restaurant sued a magazine that published an article dealing with food fads
and frauds); United Medical Labs., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.; 258 F. Supp.
735, 748-44 (D. Ore. 1966) (dictum) (mail-order laboratory sued television and radio
network following a series of reports concerning the unreliability of mail-order laboratories in general).
193 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 888 U.S. 180 (1967), Mr. Justice Harlan gained
three additional votes for his view that the New York Times test should be moderated
where public officials are not involved. Mr. Justice Harlan expressed his Preferred test as
follows:
[A] "public figure" who is not a public 6fficial may als0 recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers.
Id. at 155.
194 Even if the New York Times test is satisfied, an injunction against false disparagement should only forbid a repetition of the spcific statentents that have been
found to be deliberately or recklessly false. Otherwise, the injunction may constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. See Near v. Mirinesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1008-12 (1965).
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terested" trade libel. Marlin was, for example, cited in Electrolux as
involving "disinterested trade libel;" yet, the Marlin complaint alleged that the publisher's reason for writing the bogus letters-to-theeditor was to pressure the firearms manufacturer into resuming his
advertisements in the publisher's magazine.195 Thus, the defendant
magazine publisher had an economic self-interest in publishing the
challenged letters that was distinct from a communication medium's
normal interest in disseminating matters-significant to its audience.
Perhaps because Marlin is such a poor example of "disinterested trade
libel," some New York courts have not acknowledged that Electrolux
discarded the special damage requiremept for equitable relief where
the parties are ordinary businessmen. In Poyrolls and Tabulating,Inc.
v. Sperry Rand Corp:,196 for example, the Appellate Division, First
Department, relied on Marlin in dismissing a complaint that sought
an injunction against false dispargement by a businessman. The First
Department echoed the Marlin ppinion when it stated;
[W]here the aid of equity is sought a mere allegation of the inadequacy of legal remedy or difficulty in ascertainment of the measure
its intervention, nor change an action
of damage will not warrant
197
at law into one in equity.
3. Trade Symbol Infringement
Unlike deceptive advertising and false disparagement, trade symbol infringement is a well recognized common law tort in New York
and there are no artificial doctrinal barriers to equitable relief. Two
noteworthy common law decisions that granted equitable relief when
likelihood of confusion of sponsorship existed are Tiffany & Co. v.
Tiffany Productions,Inc.,19 s in which the famous jeweler enjoined use
of "Tiffany" by a motion picture producer, and Cornell University v,
Messing Bakeries.,199 in which Cornell University enjoined a baker
from utilizing an overly prominent display of the University's name on
a pennant, banner, scroll, or the like in conjunction with the sale of a
special formula bread that had been developed at Cornell.
The maturity of the New York common law principles dealing
1Q5 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 386, 64 IN.E* 163 (1902).

196 22 App. Div. 2d 595, 257 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1965).
197 Id. at 598, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 887; cf. Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384,
390-91, 64 N.E. 163, 164-65 (1902).
198 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mem., 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y.S.

821 (Ist Dep't 1932), af'd mem., 262 N.Y. 483, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
199 135 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modifie, 285 App. Piy. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280
(3d Dep't), af'd mem., 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421 (1955).
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with trade symbol infringement reinforces the legislative emphasis on
private remedies for such torts. On the other hand, the legislature's
neglect of statutory private remedies for deceptive advertising and
false disparagement is not adequately compensated for by common law
principles. Deceptive advertising is not generally actionable, and injunctive relief for false disparagement remains hobbled by an unnecessary special damage requirement as a result of the Court of Appeals'
timidity and imprecision in Electrolux.
4. The Prima Facie Tort
The Special Committee's hopes for evolution of the nominate torts
of deceptive advertising and false disparagement have not been fulfilled. Furthermore, despite its recognition in New York, 200 the potentially far-reaching prima facie tort concept has not been used to compensate for the deficiencies of these nominate torts.
In an oft-cited dictum, Lord Bowen described the prima facie
tort as follows: "[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the
ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage
another in that person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse." 201 As articulated by Lord Bowen, the prima
facie tort is a general principle of liability for intentional conduct that
causes actual damage. 20 2 The theoretical sweep of the prima facie tort
must be reconciled with the existence of the specific intentional (nominate) torts, like deceptive advertising and false disparagement, which
have gradually been recognized at common law. Reconciliation has
been achieved in New York by cutting the prima facie tort principle
down to manageable size.
There is a long-standing New York rule that prima facie tort
liability should be imposed only if the defendant's "sole" and "unmixed" intent was to injure the plaintiff. 20 3 Several Court of Appeals
decisions have been viewed as inconsistent with this rule,204 but the
inconsistency arises from imprecise classification of these cases as prima
E.g., Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958).
201 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), aff'd,
[1892] A.C. 25 (1891).
202 Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54
Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BU"ALo
L. REv. 7 (1957).
203 See e.g., Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954); Morrison
v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409-10 (Ist
Dep't 1965), reu'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
204 Note, Abstaining from Willful Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10
SY AcusE L. REv. 53, 57-59 (1958).
200
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facie tort cases.2°5 Admittedly, such imprecision has on occasion been
fostered by the Court of Appeals. In Advance Music Corp. v. American
2°6 for example, the
Tobacco Co.,
court analyzed a straightforward false
2°
disparagement case in prima facie tort terms.
A number of New York lower court decisions also require special
damage for a prima facie tort action to lie.208 Until recently, the Court
of Appeals has been content to specify that only "temporal damage,"
which is not necessarily special damage, 20 9 is recoverable in prima facie
tort actions. 210 Morrison v. National BroadcastingCo.,211 however, may
be a turning point. Morrison involved a suit against the producers of
a rigged television quiz show by a young academic who had appeared
on the show. He claimed that his reputation had been injured following disclosure of the rigging. The trial court denied a dilatory motion
to dismiss a claim sounding in defamation, but indicated that the
statute of limitations had run.212 The Appellate Division, First Department, modified this judgment by applying the prima facie tort theory
of liability without the customary sole-intent-to-injure and special
damage elements. The complaint was upheld on the general principle
that "[t]he intentional use of wrongful means and the intentional exposure of another to the known, unreasonable risk of harm, which
results in such harm, provides classic basis for remedy."2 13 The short
statute of limitations for defamation was held inapplicable to this general principle of liability.
The First Department's effort to liberate the prima facie tort
205 E.g., Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954), involved
breach of an employee's fiduciary obligations to his employer; Keviczky v. Lorber, 290
N.Y. 297, 49 N.E.2d 146 (1943), involved intential interference with a broker's contract
for a commission. Cf. Note, supra note 204, at 56, 64-66 & nn. 32-33.
200 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
207 Compare id. with REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A & pp. 9-10 (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1967). The possibility that Advance Music moderated the special damage require-

ment with respect to false disparagement has been foreclosed by Drug Research Corp. v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 166 N.E.2d 319, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1960).
208 E.g., Brandt v. Winchell, 286 App. Div. 249, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't 1955) (per
curiam), aff'd on other grounds, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958);
Note, supra note 204, at 63-64.
38a-39a.
210 Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 635, 148 N.E. 160, 164, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834
209 SPECIAL COMm. REPORT

(1958).
1 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.YS.2d 641 (1967).
Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 40 Misc. 2d 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup.
Ct. i
).
213 Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 288, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406,
410 (Ist Dep't 1965); see 30 ALBANY L. REv. 369, 372-73 (1966); 35 FoHAwm L. REv. 380,-

384 (1966).
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frori the sgle-in~tent-tp-injirp and special d4mage requirements was
aborted by the Court of Appeals. Morrison was reversed on the ground
that the special statute of limitations for defamation actions could not
be avoided by recasting a claim to fit a new noncategory of intentional
wrong.2 14 In dictum the Court also noted that the plaintiff's complaint
inadequately alleged special damage. 215 This delphic comment may
mean that special damage was necessary because the claim involved
libel by extrinsic fact. 216 Qn the other hand, this Statement may constitute an overt declaration by the Court of Appeals that special damage is necessary in prima facie tort actions. 21 7
The holding of the Court of Appeals in Morrison, that a prima
facie tort claim based on defamation should be treated as an ordinary
claim for defamation, supports the position of some lower courts that
a prima facie tort cannot exist if the facts give rise to a traditional
nominate tort.218 This view fosters intelligible pleading and offering
of proof, and permits discriminating application of the various tort
statutes of limitations; 219 yet it also tends to confine the prima facie
tort to the role of providing a basis for hitherto unrecognized categories of tort liability. 220 Morrison, therefore, could mean that the

recognition of deceptive advertising and false disparagement as nominate torts in New York precludes the use of facts relevant to these
nominate torts in a prima facie tort action. 22 11 In any event, the soleintent-to-injure and special damage elements of the New York prima
214 Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
215 Id. at 458, 227 N.E.2d at 574, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
216 See Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 40 Misc. 2d 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 Com_LL L.Q. 14 (1961).
217 See also Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 80-81, 111 N.E.2d 214, 217-18 (1953)
(cited on this point ,by the Court of Appeals in Morrison). This would negate the contrary implication in Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70
N.E.2d 401 (1946).
218 E.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955); Brandt
v. Winch.ell, 283 App. Div. 338, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, leave to appeal denied, 283 App. Div.
794, 129 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Ist Dep't 1954 (mem.)).
219 Thornton & McNiece, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
1495, 1509-10 (1956).
220 See Halpern, supra note 202, at 11. But cf. Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine,
52 COLUm. L. Rav. 503, 512-13 (1952) (stating that the doctrine induces relaxation of
technicalities).
221 But see Note, supra note 204 at 64-66. The Note's suggestion that injurious falsehood is somehow different from other nominate torts in this respect is difficult to justify.
See Glenn v. Advertising Publ., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889, 906-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Penn-Ohio
Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. C., 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 184 N.Y.S.2d 68, modified on
other grounds, 8 App. Div. 2d 808, 187 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1959) (mem).
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facie tort doctrine all but render the tort useless as a s'upplemefit to
the nominate torts of deceptive advertising and false disparagement. 222

iii
THE CASE

FOR ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORm ACT IN

NEW YoRK

The case for enactment of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in New York is succinct. The New York legislature has passed
countless statutes condemning deceptive advertising and has appropriated considerable monies to finance the public regulation of deceptive advertising. Yeti the gap in the New York common law with
respect to the actionability of deceptive advertising remains unfilled.
Adoption of the Uiiform Act would compensate for the deficiencies
of the common law and enlist the self-financing private injuhctive suit
in the struggle against deceptive advertising. "There is no real reason
to require the [expenditure of] ... public money to proceed against
trade liars if private competitors [and others] are willing to take on
223
the job."
The Uniform Act also flatly repudiates the necessity of establishing special damage in order to obtain an injunction against false
m2 24
disparagement by businessmen.
In Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth,
225
Inc.,
the Court of Appeals seemed to favor this approach, but failed
to write an opinion that unequivocally signaled the demise of the special damage requirement in a commercial context.2 26 Enactment of
the Uniform Act will achieve this objective without the delay involved
in waiting for an appropriate case to reach the Court of Appeals.
The provisions of the Uniform Act dealing with trade symbol
See SPECILl CoMmt. REPoRT 32a-39a; Brown, supra note 202.
Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987, 1000
(1949). The social utility of a private action against deceptive advertising is discussed in
Dole, supra note 12, at 697-700.
224 UNIFORE AcT § 2(a)(8) declares false disparagement to be a deceptive trade
practice, and § 3(a) states:
A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another
may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on
terms that the court considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of
profits, or intent to deceive is not required....
The act only applies to deceptive practices committed in the course of a "business,
vocation, or occupation." Id. § 2(a). Publishers, broadcasters, printers, and other persons
engaged in the dissemination of information are exempt from the act as long as they
do not knowingly disseminate deceptive material. Id. § 4(a)(2).
225 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S2d 977 (1959).
226 See pp. 776-78 & notes 173-93 supra.
222
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infringement are not significant additions to New York law. New York
has a highly developed law of trade symbol infringement, which includes both statutory and common law recognition that conduct creating a likelihood of confusion of sponsorship is actionable. Nevertheless,
en bloc New York enactment of the Uniform Act is desirable. 2 Like
all uniform acts, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act has a "uniformity
of interpretation" clause, which declares that the "Act shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it. ' 228 This clause makes decisions interpreting a uniform act highly persuasive in other jurisdictions that have
adopted the same act, and would give maximum stature to New York
decisions applying the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The result might
well be a more perceptive general application of the trade symbol provisions of the Uniform Act than would otherwise be the case. This
result, like enactment of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act itself,
would be in accord with New York's frequent role as a leader in legal
reform.
227 A New York State Bar Association Committee has recently observed that it is an
open question whether New York should adopt all or part of the Uniform Act. 1967
REPORT OF THE Comm.ON NEW YoRK STATE ANTITRUST LAW, NEW YoRK STATE BAR Ass'N
11 (footnote).
228 UNI ORm Acr § 5.

